Abstract: The paper analyses quantity competition in economies in which a network describes the set of feasible trades. A model is presented in which the identity of buyers, of sellers, and of intermediaries is endogenously determined by the trade ‡ows in the economy. The analysis …rst considers small economies, and provides su¢ cient conditions for equilibrium existence, a characterization of prices and ‡ows, and some negative results relating welfare to network structure. The second and central part of the analysis considers behavior in large markets, and presents necessary and su¢ cient conditions on the network structure for equilibria to be approximately e¢ cient when the number of players is large.
Introduction
Classical models of competition rely on the anonymity of markets to explain prices and trade. According to this view, exchanges in an economy take place in centralized markets and the identity of players has no e¤ect on prices and terms of trade. Recent models of decentralized competition depart from such a stark paradigm by considering markets in which exchanges take place in bilateral relationships. Prices and outcomes in such economies crucially depend on the set of feasible trades and on the implied market power. Results to date have mainly focused on economies in which the identity of buyers and sellers is exogenously determined, and in which only trade from sellers to buyers are feasible. This study analyzes decentralized oligopolistic markets in which the role of players in the economy is determined in equilibrium, and presents conditions on the structure of an economy for trade to be almost e¢ cient when the number of players is large.
The paper introduces a static model of decentralized oligopolistic trade for economies in which a network describes the set of feasible trading relationships. In the model, individuals choose their supply to neighboring players, correctly anticipating that the equilibrium price for a trade will be given by a buyer's marginal value. Since trade a¤ects the marginal rate of substitution of both players involved in a transaction, supply decisions in ‡uence both the price at which goods are purchased and the price at which they are sold. Traders maximize their private utility, taking into account how their supply decisions a¤ect prices. The resulting ‡ow of goods endogenously determines whether an individual buys, sells, or does both based on preferences, production possibilities and the position held in the network. That is, supply chains arise endogenously in this model. Intermediation and signi…cant price dispersion are generic phenomena in small or poorly connected economies.
When the number of players is small, trade is necessarily ine¢ cient because of the price distortions implied by quantity competition. However, when the number of players is large, simple conditions can be imposed on an economy to ensure that trade is approximately ef…cient. To study large markets with a …xed topology, the analysis introduces the notion of community structure of a trade network. Communities consist of subsets of players who share the same potential trade partners in the economy. For instance, when the network captures the geography of an economy, a community identi…es the subset of players at a given geographical location. The analysis of large markets …xes the community structure and considers what happens when the number of players in some communities is large. Even when communities are large, trade between communities and intermediation may still be required to support an e¢ cient allocation. Our main result establishes that trade is almost e¢ cient if and only if it is possible to clear markets without recourse to intermediation in any large community. If so, direct competition among players belonging to neighboring large communities eliminates resale and restores e¢ ciency. In contrast, when intermediation is required to implement the e¢ cient allocation, players mediating trade necessarily command a rent and distort trade, as their supply decisions a¤ect feasible outcomes. If so, trade remains ine¢ cient even when an economy is arbitrarily large.
The …rst part of the analysis develops baseline results for economies in which the number of players is small. It presents: su¢ cient conditions for pure strategy equilibrium existence; a characterization equilibrium prices, ‡ows and markups; and some negative results on welfare. A key feature of the out ‡ow model is that resale markups are strictly positive due to the doublemarginalization problem faced by players acting as intermediaries. Thus, goods never cycle in equilibrium, and not all linked players with di¤erent marginal rates of substitution elect to trade. Individuals would never purchase units previously sold, because a higher price would have to be paid; and individuals with low willingness to pay might prefer not to sell their goods, as trade might increase the price paid on the units purchased. 1 Equilibrium behavior involves price discrimination across locations of the trade network. Intermediation arises both because of the scarcity of trading partners and because of the di¤erent prices that prevail throughout the economy in equilibrium.
Results on welfare …rst establish that trade is always ine¢ cient in economies populated by …nitely many players, and then present some negative conclusions relating welfare to network structure. Adding trading relationships does not necessarily improve social welfare in these markets, as more goods may ‡ow to low value markets when sellers price discriminate locations in which the goods are most desired. More surprisingly, even though players have the option not to trade with any one of their neighbors, the welfare of an individual may decline when the number of players in his neighborhood increases. Since trading relationships are common knowledge, whenever new links raise the demand of an individual, price discrimination by his suppliers may decrease the amount of goods sold to him and consequently his welfare.
The second part of the analysis studies behavior in economies with a large number of players. It considers economies in which players are of …nitely many types and are positioned at …nitely many locations connected by a network. Necessary and su¢ cient conditions are presented for trade to be almost e¢ cient when the number of players in every community is large. Any economy in which intermediation is required to clear markets, is ine¢ cient independently of the size and structure of the market. Intermediaries necessarily command a rent whenever they are needed to distribute goods, and competition among them can reduce, but not eliminate resale markups. E¢ cient trade in such markets is equivalent to the existence of ‡ows of goods that are both direct and e¢ cient. Necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence of such ‡ows are derived. These conditions are analogous to market clearing requirements for two-sided markets, and require the aggregate demand of any subset of communities not to exceed the aggregate supply of communities with whom direct trade is feasible. Equilibrium outcomes can be fully characterized even when the conditions for e¢ ciency fail. In such instances, intermediation and distortions persist even when the number of players at every location is arbitrarily large. Similar results are developed for economies in which only a subset of communities is large. E¢ cient trade in large communities is again equivalent to the existence of direct and e¢ cient ‡ows of goods between those communities. E¢ ciency in small communities further requires that players in those locations be able to directly trade in some large market. Results also establish that social welfare converges monotonically to e¢ ciency when all communities grow large.
The analysis concludes by presenting an alternative quantity competition model in which individuals decide how much to buy, and in which units are sold at marginal value. Similar results hold, even though the distribution of rents di¤ers. More rents ‡ow to buyers, and social welfare is generally higher than when players choose how much to sell.
Literature Review: A vast recent literature has analyzed trade in buyer-seller networks. Such models usually take the identity of buyers and sellers in an economy as an exogenous characteristic of the market, and describe the set of feasible trades from sellers to buyers with a network. These papers di¤er mainly in how competition is modelled. Kranton All of these models however, rule out intermediation by assumption, and implicitly set the identity of buyers and sellers as a primitive of the problem.
Other papers have introduced some notion of intermediation in the context of a two-sided market. Blume, Easley, Kleinberg and Tardos 2007 study buyer-seller networks in which all trades have to be mediated by price-setting middlemen. Equilibria in this setting always implement an e¢ cient allocation, and middlemen command a positive rent if and only if they possess an essential connection in the network structure. Siedlarek 2013 allows for more general structures of intermediation in the context of a model of coalitional bargaining, and shows that e¢ ciency obtains when no intermediary is essential. The e¢ ciency result however, relies partly on exogeneity of sellers and buyers and partly on the centralized nature of the bargain-ing protocol considered. Manea 2014 has recently developed similar results in the context of a decentralized bargaining model, and identi…ed frictions that might arise in such models. A related literature analyzes competition between owners of links on a network in which individuals sel…shly route ‡ows (Chawla and Roughgarden 2007 , Acemoglu and Ozdaglar 2007 , Choi Galeotti and Goyal 2014 . This literature usually takes a Bertrand approach, and was developed to model competition between internet providers pricing information streams.
The quantity competition model presented here di¤ers from the models discussed above, as the roles of individuals in a supply chain are endogenously determined in equilibrium. Kakade, Kerns and Orthiz 2004 characterizes the competitive equilibria of a general networked market in which the roles of players are endogenous. However, price taking behavior implies that network structure cannot directly a¤ect market power. Condorelli and Galeotti 2012 analyzes sequential trade of a single unit in a general networked market in which there is some incomplete information about the value of the good. In the model prices decrease along the supply chain as trade reveals a low value for the good. This setting is closest in spirit to that of the current paper. But due to the complications arising from incomplete information and dynamics, the model remains stylized and does not deliver the results presented here.
The spirit of the analysis is close to the oligopoly and trade literature surveyed in Leahy and Roadmap: Section 2 analyses out ‡ow competition. It presents the model, a characterization of equilibrium prices and ‡ows, and results for small economies. Section 3 discusses out ‡ow competition in large economies, and presents conditions for e¢ ciency. Section 4 discusses in ‡ow competition. Section 5 concludes. All proofs can be found in appendix.
Out ‡ow Competition
The section begins with a description of the economy and of the out ‡ow competition model, and proceeds with results on equilibrium behavior and welfare in small economies.
The Economy and E¢ ciency
Consider an economy with a …nite set of players, V , and two goods. For convenience, refer to the two goods as consumption q, and money m. Any player i in the economy can trade goods only with a subset of players V i V nfig, which is called the neighborhood of Player i. Assume that j 2 V i if and only if i 2 V j . This structure of interaction de…nes an undirected graph G = (V; E) in which ij 2 E if and only if j 2 V i . Refer to G as the trade network. Assume that trade network is connected, as any component would act as a separate economy otherwise. 2 Denote by q i j the ‡ow of consumption good from individual i to individual j. Since trade can occur only between players that know each other, q i j = 0 whenever ji = 2 E. For any player i, de…ne the total purchases and the total sales of consumption good respectively as
Let the net-trade of Player i be de…ned as the di¤erence between these two quantities, q i = q i q i , and let the resale of Player i be de…ned as the smallest among the two, r i = min fq i ; q i g.
When an individual purchases more (fewer) units than those he sells, his resale consists of all the units that he sells (buys). Bold letters are used to denote vectors of ‡ows. In particular, q i denotes the vector of consumption ‡ows from i to his neighbors in V i ; q denotes the Cartesian product of all the q i 's; and q i denotes the Cartesian product of q j for all j 6 = i.
The utility of every individual in the economy is separable in the two goods, and linear in money. In particular, Player i's utility for a net-trade q i and an amount of money m simply satis…es
The net-trade of any player i is bounded from below by a non-positive number Q i . Refer to Q i as the capacity of Player i. Since Q i > 0 is possible, players can sell more units, than they purchase. This setup can capture both endowment and production economies. In the production interpretation of the model, u i (q i ) can be viewed as the cost of supplying q i > 0 units to the market. Non-negativity constraints on monetary holdings are neglected throughout the analysis. It is implicitly assumed that monetary endowments are su¢ ciently large for such constraints never to bind. The following standard assumptions on payo¤s are maintained throughout. Assumption A1 For any player i 2 V , u i is three times continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave on [ Q i ; 1).
For convenience, denote an economy by E = fV; G; Q; ug. For any pro…le of ‡ows q 2 R E + , social welfare is evaluated by the sum of payo¤s. Since the payo¤s are quasi-linear and monetary endowments are large, any interior Pareto optimum maximizes the sum of the utilities of the non-linear good. As all trades can be executed when the network is connected, the de…nition of e¢ ciency abstracts from the network structure and only identi…es welfare maximizing nettrades. 3 E¢ ciency: A pro…le of net-trades q 2 R V + is e¢ cient for an economy E if it solves
Assumption A1 implies that e¢ cient net-trades exist, and that they would attain as a competitive equilibrium in the corresponding centralized market.
Out ‡ow Competition
In the model of competition considered, the description of the economy is common knowledge. 4 Players can only trade with their neighbors, and simultaneously decide how many units of consumption to sell to each of them while being required not to sell more units than their capacity Q i . As customary in quantity competition models, prices are determined so that buyers pay all of the units purchased at their marginal value. In particular, the price paid by Player i for units sold from a neighbor j is determined by i's inverse demand curve for consumption,
The proposed pricing mechanism could be micro-founded in the context of a two-stage model in which suppliers …rst commit to sales of consumption to known buyers, and then compete on prices to supply these buyers. Indeed, if suppliers were able to commit to out ‡ows, and if they were to compete on prices at each local market given their out ‡ow decisions, equation (1) would still dictate pricing, since no supplier would bene…t from a unilateral deviation in the price-setting game. Price reductions would not a¤ect the quantity sold as all units supplied are sold, while price increases would reduce revenues because of falling sales. This observation was …rst made in Kreps and Scheinkman 1983 while studying Bertrand competition with quantity commitment. Their results extend immediately to the out ‡ow framework, since no restrictions were imposed on the number of buyers. 5 Thus, pricing in the out ‡ow model captures behavior in markets in which local supply decisions have to be made prior to competition.
The concavity of the utility function implies that the price paid by any player i decreases 3 If the network had more than one component, e¢ ciency would also have to account for the infeasibility of trade across components. 4 The assumption is strong, but considerably simpli…es the analysis. It is plausible for environments in which the network captures geographical or legal trade costs. It would be interesting to study a setup in which players have incomplete information about the global network structure. The analysis presented here would apply only to setups in which players hold correct beliefs about equilibrium net-trades at neighboring locations. 5 The proposed two-stage model would always possess Subgame Perfect equilibria in which prices and ‡ows coincide with the Nash equilibria of the out ‡ow competition model. when his in ‡ows increase, increases when his out ‡ows increase, and is not directly a¤ected by other ‡ows in the economy. That is, @p i (q i )=@q j i < 0 and @p i (q i )=@q i j > 0 for any neighbor j 2 V i . When choosing their out ‡ows, sellers account for the distortions that their supply decisions might induce both on the prices they receive for each unit sold and on the price they pay for each unit bought. The welfare of an individual i given a pro…le of ‡ows q is therefore determined by the map,
where prices are pinned down by equation (1), and where the summation denotes the trade surplus of Player i. In what follows the expression out ‡ow equilibrium will be used to refer to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the out ‡ow competition model.
Out ‡ow Equilibrium Flows q 2 R E + constitute an out ‡ow equilibrium, if for any i 2 V ,
The out ‡ow constraint q i Q i requires total sales not exceed capacity, and is more demanding than requiring net-trades to be bounded by capacity. The constraint implies that players cannot resell units unless these can potentially be produced in house. Although the stronger restriction is far from ideal in many applications, it has no e¤ect on the results and it is only imposed for clarity, as it guarantees that action sets do not depend on the supply decisions of other players. All of the conclusions presented (including those on existence) would also hold under the weaker out ‡ow constraint q i Q i . However, the model would cease to be a game as the set of feasible actions would be determined in equilibrium by means of a …xed point argument.
Out ‡ow Equilibrium Existence
The …rst result presents su¢ cient conditions for out ‡ow equilibrium existence, and a characterization of equilibrium ‡ows of consumption. Bounds are imposed on the slope and the curvature of every demand function to guarantee that the payo¤ of every player remains well-behaved (a standard assumption in imperfect competition models). Denote the elasticity of the inverse demand curve of Player i with respect to quantity by i (q) = (Q i + q)u 00 i (q)=u 0 i (q). Also, denote Player i's total cost of supplying out ‡ows and Player i's revenue from suppling units to market j 2 V i respectively by
The total cost of supplying out ‡ows is determined by adding the cost of forgone net-trades u i (q i ) to the expenditure on in ‡ows u 0 i (q i )q i . The welfare of an individual can thus, be expressed as the sum of the revenue made in each neighboring market, minus the total cost of supplying such out ‡ows.
Consider the following constraints on the elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand curve with respect to quantity. Assumption A2 For any player i 2 V , the utility u i satis…es at least one of the following two conditions for any q > Q i :
Assumption A2 is evocative of the su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a solution to the monopoly problem, as it bounds the elasticity of demand from above. 6 Conditions in A2 are stronger however, as the elasticity must also be bounded from below when players are allowed both to buy and to sell units.
The next result establishes that assumption A2 guarantees the existence of an out ‡ow equilibrium, and characterizes the conditions identifying any out ‡ow equilibrium. 
Existence obtains because the set of feasible out ‡ows of every player is non-empty, convex and compact, and because assumption A2 guarantees that best responses are continuous and single-valued (and that Brouwer's …xed point theorem thus applies). In particular, condition B1 requires revenues to be concave and total costs to be convex in any market; while condition B2 requires total costs to be convex and revenues to be concave only when revenues increase in a market. Either condition implies that best responses are single-valued, as the payo¤ of every player is concave whenever increasing. Any combination of the bounds would also grant existence, as the lowerbounds discipline only total costs, while the upperbounds only revenues. It can be readily veri…ed that common families of preferences meet the proposed conditions for out ‡ow equilibrium existence.
Remark 2 An out ‡ow equilibrium exists if one of the following two conditions holds:
The second part of Proposition 1 characterizes out ‡ow equilibria as solutions to the system of best responses (where i denotes the multiplier on the capacity constraint of Player i 2 V ). When the out ‡ow constraint q i Q i does not bind, the optimality of an interior out ‡ow q i j > 0 simply requires that
If so, the markup on the ‡ow q i j (the di¤erence between price received and the marginal cost of forgone consumption) is completely determined by two wedges: one distorts of the price paid by Player j, while the other distorts the price paid by i for all in ‡ows purchased. The …rst wedge is due to the fact that i is a Cournot supplier of j, while the second wedge is due to the fact i is a monopsonistic buyer at his location. Pricing behavior in the out ‡ow model favors suppliers as the demand curve is used to clear each local market. Section 4 explores the consequences of the alternative setup in which sellers own the trading location and in which buyers commit to in ‡ows.
Four Player Examples
Before the formal discussion of out ‡ow equilibrium properties, consider a simple economy with four players, labeled fa; b; c; dg. Let Q a = 5, Q b = 2, and Q c = Q d = 1=2, and assume that preferences of every Player i satisfy u i (q) = (Q i + q)
1=2 . Throughout the examples, for convenience, interpret Q i and Q i + q i respectively as the endowment and the equilibrium consumption of Player i. If no trade takes place in the economy, social welfare is worth 5:06. E¢ ciency instead, requires players to split the consumption good equally. Social welfare at this allocation is maximal and equal to 5:66. Equal sharing however, is not an out ‡ow equilibrium even when all trades are feasible. When the trade network is complete, in the unique out ‡ow equilibrium Player a sells to all of his neighbors, and Player b resells some of the goods purchased from a to c and d. Players c and d do not trade with each other since they are identical and in a symmetric position. 7 Equilibrium ‡ows do not equalize marginal rates of substitutions. The price paid by consumers c and d for each unit of consumption purchased is 0:41. This price exceeds the price charged by consumer a to b on the units traded, 0:34. Even though a has the option not to sell to his competitor, b, he prefers to do so, because it is pro…table, and because it is impossible to prevent b from supplying the …nal consumers, c and d. Thus, Player b is able to impose a 21% markup on all the units that he resells. Equilibrium ‡ows for this economy are reported in the …rst network of …gure 1. Consumption, prices and welfare can be found in the …rst matrix of table 1. In equilibrium, consumers a and b curtail their supply to c and d in order to maximize their gains from trade. The allocation is ine¢ cient and social welfare is equal to 5:61. Table 1 : Equilibrium prices paid, consumption x = Q + q, and welfare for each player in the four economies.
If the link between players b and d is also removed from the network, consumer d remains with only a and c as potential suppliers, while consumer c can still purchase from both a and b. In equilibrium, a and b still supply all of their neighbors. But, consumer c opts not to resell to d despite having more consumption good than d, since selling to d would increase the price paid on all the units purchased. In the out ‡ow model, linked players with di¤erent marginal rates of substitution occasionally choose not to trade, as a commitment not to resell can signi…cantly reduce the price paid on all the units purchased. The third network in …gure 1 and the third matrix in table 1 characterize the unique equilibrium of this economy. Since Player c has two suppliers, while Player d has only one that is active, Player c pays a lower price for consumption than d. Player a sells more units in the competitive market than in the one in which he is a monopolist. Social welfare decreases further to 5:58. 
Out ‡ow Equilibrium Properties
Two sets of results are presented about out ‡ow equilibria in economies with a small number of players. The …rst addresses the properties of equilibrium ‡ows and pricing, while the latter presents several negative conclusions on welfare.
In the out ‡ow model, consumption ‡ows from players with low marginal value to players with high marginal value, as assumption A1 implies that q
The worst possible use of the goods owned is therefore consumption and not trade; and buyers are never willing to pay more than their marginal value for the last unit purchased. Consumption ‡ows only in one direction on every link, and at most jEj =2 ‡ows are positive in equilibrium. Individuals sell, or resell, goods to their neighbors only if the gains from trade compensate them both for the monopsony price distortion on in ‡ows and for the Cournot distortion on out ‡ows. A positive di¤erence in marginal rates of substitution is therefore necessary, but not su¢ cient for trade to take place among pairs of linked individuals. Small di¤erences in marginal rates of substitution may not su¢ ce for trade to take place, as the monopsony distortion may prevent trade between players who value consumption similarly. Equilibrium retail markups are always strictly positive, as q i r i > 0 implies that p j (q j ) > p i (q i ) even when q i j is small. Intermediation however, remains a common phenomenon because of the limited number of trading relationships that can be used to transfer goods, and because of the sellers'incentives to price discriminate neighboring buyers. The latter motive explains why intermediation can take place in equilibrium even when the trade network is complete. The next proposition summarizes several useful properties of out ‡ow equilibria. For convenience, refer to an individual as a source (sink) if he does not buy (sell) consumption.
Proposition 3 If A1 and A2 hold, in any out ‡ow equilibrium q: Part (a) follows from the previous discussion, and (b) is an immediate consequence of goods being resold at strictly positive markups. In fact, because the marginal utility of consumption strictly increases along any supply chain, it can never be that an individual buys units he previously sold. Since goods do not cycle, ‡ows of goods move from sources to sinks. Flows however, may have more than one source and/or sink in equilibrium. Part (c) follows because individuals with lower marginal utility than their neighbors would never buy, as only players with lower marginal utility could supply them, and must therefore be sources. Similarly, individuals with higher marginal utility than their neighbors would never sell, and must therefore be sinks. Part (d) shows why sources sell to every neighbor with higher marginal utility if the out ‡ow constraint does not bind. If so, a positive di¤erence in marginal rates of substitution is not only necessary, but also su¢ cient for trade to take place, because sources have no in ‡ows and because out ‡ow price distortions vanish with out ‡ows. Part (e) …nally, establishes that if two players have a neighbor in common, that neighbor sells to the low marginal utility player only if he sells to the high marginal utility player. Results in the web-appendix show that when the network is complete, the ranking of marginal utilities coincides with the ranking of supply costs. 8 The next result exploits some of the properties of out ‡ow equilibria to derive several negative conclusions on welfare. As before, evaluate social welfare by summing the welfare of each player in the economy,
Results establish that ine¢ ciencies are a common feature of the out ‡ow equilibrium model, and show why adding links might have unexpected consequences on individual and social welfare.
Proposition 4 If A1 holds, the following conclusions apply for i; j 2 V : (a) an e¢ cient out ‡ow equilibrium q exists if and only if q = 0 is e¢ cient; (b) equilibrium social welfare in a network (V; E) can be higher than in a network (V; E [ ij); (c) equilibrium welfare of i in a network (V; E) can be higher than in a network (V; E [ ij).
When trade is required to support the e¢ cient allocation, any out ‡ow equilibrium is necessarily ine¢ cient, as price distortions curtail trade in any local market. If so, social welfare may decline when new trading relationships are added to the network. 9 A new trading link can further distort the allocation of consumption, as pro…t maximization by sellers may reallocate consumption from high to low value buyers. The payo¤ of a player can also decline when a new trading partner is added to his neighborhood. If a new trading partner increases the marginal value of consumption of Player i (due to the option value of reselling units), players selling to i might curtail their supply in order to extract some of the surplus generated in the new relationship. If this e¤ect is su¢ ciently pronounced, Player i's payo¤ declines in any out ‡ow equilibrium when a new trading partner is added to his neighborhood. 10 Welfare conclusions rely on the market power frictions implicit in any quantity competition model. The main aim of the rest of the analysis is to provide conditions on the network structure for such frictions to vanish when the number of players in the economy is large.
Comments on Out ‡ow Competition and Market Power:
In the model presented, nodes on a network were interpreted as separate local markets. Competitors used their access to different locations to price discriminate their customers. As discrimination within a local market was ruled out by linear pricing, discriminating across markets was welfare maximizing for suppliers. Preferences and access to markets jointly determined prices, welfare and market power. Goods were exchanged at local prices that di¤ered from the competitive equilibrium price. Resale at positive markups was common even in well connected economies, and was driven by the arbitrage opportunities that the di¤erent prices in the economy o¤ered to traders. The monopsony wedges were the main force limiting intermediation in the model, as the cost of supplying units was shown to increase along any supply chain. Although an explicit characterization of market power remains desirable, it was not possible to deliver a tractable and general result mainly due to the non-linearities in the complementarity problem characterizing the out ‡ow equilibria.
Large Markets and E¢ ciency
This section analyzes pricing behavior in economies with a large number of traders, and presents necessary and su¢ cient conditions on the network topology for out ‡ow equilibrium trades to be approximately e¢ cient. To impose some discipline on the network structure as the number of players diverges to in…nity, the analysis introduces the notion of community structure of a trade network. A community will be de…ned as a complete subgraph in which all players share the same neighbors. Any trade network will be represented by a corresponding network among communities. The analysis …xes the topology among communities and studies out ‡ow equilibrium behavior when communities are large. The aim of this exercise is to provide a tractable model of market power distortions in large markets. Communities here will be interpreted as cities to capture a distinctive feature of cities, namely that individuals of a given city are located in the same geographical position (and can thus freely trade with other inhabitants of their city and with the same set of neighboring cities).
The …rst result presents necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence of trade ‡ows among communities which are e¢ cient and direct (without resale). Such conditions follow from an adaptation of Hall's marriage theorem to our more complex environment. 11 The analysis proceeds to show that these conditions are both necessary and su¢ cient for the existence of an e¢ cient out ‡ow equilibrium when the number of players in every community is large. When all communities have comparable magnitudes, these conditions imply that intermediation must be negligible for trade to be e¢ cient in every community. When communities have di¤erent magnitudes approximate e¢ ciency only requires the absence of intermediation between any two large communities. In such economies, trade in smaller communities may remain ine¢ cient unless large communities can execute all of their trades. The section concludes with some examples and by discussing the relationship between social welfare and market size.
Community Structure and Market Clearing
The notion of community structure of a network G is now introduced. A subset of players
Thus, a community consists of a completely connected subset of players who share the same players as neighbors. 12 A community di¤ers from a clique (a maximal complete subgraph) in that players share the same neighbors if they belong to the same community, but not necessarily if they belong to the same clique. Denote by C the set of communities of a network G. The set C uniquely partitions the vertices of the original trade network into disjoint subsets of players. The community structure of a network G is network G = (C; E) with communities as vertices C and with edges between any two communities C; K 2 C de…ned so that CK 2 E if ij 2 E for some i 2 C and j 2 K. The de…nition of community implies that, whenever two communities are linked, all of their inhabitants can trade with each other. The rest of the analysis presents results in terms of the community structure. The approach is without loss of generality, as there is a one-to-one mapping between community structure and network structure.
To understand when intermediation is needed to clear markets at the e¢ cient allocation, it is useful to understand some properties of the e¢ cient net-trade q. Let D = fi 2 V j q i > 0g denote the set of players demanding consumption at the e¢ cient pro…le q, and let S = fi 2 V j q i < 0g denote the set of players supplying consumption at q. Refer to players in D as buyers, and to players in S as sellers. For any community C 2 C, denote by q + C = P i2C\D q i the aggregate demand of that community, and denote by q C = P i2C\S q i its aggregate supply. The e¢ cient 11 Hall's marriage theorem provides conditions on a bipartite graph for the existence of a match that clears the short side of the market (Bollobas 1998) . 12 The de…nition of community implies that
net-trade of any community can thus be de…ned as the di¤erence between these two quantities,
For any subset of communities T C, let V T denote the set of communities that can trade with at least one community in T ,
and de…ne the excess-supply and the excess-demand of group T respectively as
The excess-supply (excess-demand) amounts to the di¤erence between the aggregate supply (demand) of communities who can directly sell to (buy from) communities in T and the aggregate demand (supply) of communities in T . These de…nitions depend on the network structure and on the notion of e¢ ciency, but not on any element of the out ‡ow competition setup. For convenience, say that an economy meets condition MC (or market clearing) if any group of communities faces a non-negative excess-supply.
Condition MC: Economy E satis…es MC if (T; q) 0 for any T C.
A simple economy satisfying MC is one in which every seller is linked to every buyer. If so, MC holds trivially as the aggregate excess supply equals zero by construction, (C; q) = 0.
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The next result generalizes Hall's marriage theorem to our environment. It establishes that condition MC is both necessary and su¢ cient for the existence of direct ‡ows of consumption from sellers to buyers that support an e¢ cient allocation q. The proposition also shows that MC is equivalent to requiring any group of communities to face a non-negative excess-demand. The result is related to Gale 1957 , who studies the existence of market clearing ‡ows in environments in which intermediation is possible, and in which the capacity of every link is bounded.
Proposition 5 For any economy E the following three statements are equivalent: (a) the economy satis…es MC; (b) (T; q) 0 for any T C; (c) there exists q 2 R E + such that:
The third statement in the proposition amounts to the existence of consumption ‡ows that clear markets in environments in which intermediation is not feasible. E¢ cient and direct ‡ows of consumption exist if and only if any subset of communities can have its e¢ cient net-trade met by those communities to which it is linked to. 14 As in the marriage theorem, the more surprising part of the result is that MC is su¢ cient for the existence of such ‡ows of consumption, since necessity obtains trivially. The existence of direct and e¢ cient consumption ‡ows plays a central role in the analysis of large markets, as results establish that intermediation necessarily distorts trade.
Large Markets and Out ‡ow Competition E¢ ciency
The next results present su¢ cient conditions on community structure for the existence of an approximately e¢ cient out ‡ow equilibrium when some communities are large. Large markets are introduced by …xing community structure and increasing the number of players in some communities. The approach is convenient, as it a¤ects the extent of the competition in each community without changing the overall topology among communities. When communities are interpreted as cities and the community structure as the network of the feasible trades among cities (where limitations arise either because of geography or because of trade barriers), the analysis provides conditions on the economy for trade to be e¢ cient when some cities are large.
It is convenient to introduce the notion of a replica economy in the context of markets in which a subset of communities is large and comparable in magnitude (cities), while the remaining communities are small (villages). This approach is almost without loss of generality, since conclusions on approximate e¢ ciency rely only on behavior in communities with the largest magnitude. Fix a baseline economy E = fC; E; Q; ug, a number z 2 N + , and a subset of communitiesĈ C.
[R0] for any C 2 CnĈ there exists C z = C;
[R1] for any C 2Ĉ there exists C z = fi:sji 2 C & s 2 f1; :::; zgg;
The …rst two conditions state that for any community in the baseline economy there is a corresponding replicated community in its (Ĉ;z)-replica. Replicated communities inĈ consist of z copies of the players in the baseline community, while replicated communities not inĈ coincide with those in the baseline economy. The last two conditions in the de…nition instead require that community structure is not a¤ected by replication, and that all copies of a player have the same capacity and preferences. While increasing competition within each community, the notion of replica preserves the community structure in an economy and the composition of players within each community (only increasing the number of players in some communities). The concept of replica is introduced for sake of tractability, but any large market with a …nite number of communities populated by …nitely many types of players can be approximated by a replica economy. A (Ĉ;z)-replica is said to be balanced ifĈ = C. Balanced replicas keep the relative size of communities constant, and guarantee that all communities remain comparable in magnitude. A convenient feature of balanced replication is that the e¢ cient net-trades of players coincide in any replica of a baseline economy, as preferences are concave. Therefore, buyers (sellers) in an economy remain buyers (sellers) in anyone of its replicas. In contrast, when replication is not balancedĈ 6 = C, e¢ cient net-trades may di¤er in any two replicas, since the composition of players in the economy might be a¤ected by the replication process.
A sequence of replica economies
is said to converge to e¢ ciency, if there exists a sequence of out ‡ow equilibria in which net-trades converge pointwise to the e¢ cient nettrades for every player in every community. Similarly, a sequence of replica economies is said to converge to approximate e¢ ciency, if there exists a sequence of out ‡ow equilibria in which net-trades converge pointwise to the e¢ cient net-trades for every player in any community belonging toĈ. The notion of approximate e¢ ciency is introduced as the surplus of any small community is negligible compared to aggregate surplus in any large replica economy.
Begin by considering balanced replication. Proposition 6 is central to the analysis, and shows that condition MC is both necessary and su¢ cient for out ‡ow equilibrium net-trades to converge to e¢ ciency when all communities have comparable magnitudes. Furthermore, trade converges to e¢ ciency only if no player resells consumption in the limiting economy. Intermediaries command a rent that distorts trade in markets of any size. When each local market becomes more competitive, players become price takers as sellers, but never as buyers since they retain local monopsony power when purchasing goods. The wedge on in ‡ow prices cannot disappear for intermediaries mediating a non-negligible ‡ow of consumption, as their trading decisions a¤ect the allocation of consumption in the economy and consequently welfare. Thus, large economies failing condition MC never converge to e¢ ciency, as players acting as intermediaries would necessarily command a rent if they were required to mediate trade. In the out ‡ow model, intermediaries retain market power whenever their aggregate supply decisions a¤ect feasible outcomes. If instead MC holds, competition among sellers in large communities eliminates rents on all trades and thus any motive for resale. If so, intermediation vanishes, out ‡ow equilibrium net-trades converge to e¢ ciency, and a unique price reigns in the limiting economy. The result views anonymous centralized Walrasian markets as approximations of nonanonymous decentralized markets in which a large number of buyers and sellers can directly trade with each other (as would be the case in an economy in which every community with a non-negligible aggregate demand is able trade with every other community with a non-negligible aggregate supply). A convenient feature of the proposed balanced replication process is that MC can be imposed directly on the baseline economy rather than on the entire sequence of replicas. A testable implication of the out ‡ow model is that resale markups are strictly positive even in large markets. In contrast, most price-competition models predict that intermediaries never command rent when more than one supply chain exists (Choi, Galeotti and Goyal 2014).
Next consider unbalanced replication. To guarantee that the e¢ cient net-trades remain bounded when an unbalanced replica grows large, an additional technical assumption has to be imposed on preferences.
Assumption A3 For any player i 2 V , the utility u i satis…es lim q!1 u 0 i (q) = 0.
Denote byV = [ C2Ĉ C the set of players located in one of the large communities, and by V nV the set of players located in one of the small communities of a (Ĉ; z)-replica. Let q z 2 R V + denote the e¢ cient net-trades of any type of player in a (Ĉ;z)-replica, and let q 1 = lim z!1 q z . Such net-trades coincide for all copies of a player-type due to concavity of preferences. The results on unbalanced replication require further discipline on the community structure to guarantee that net-trades converge to e¢ ciency in small communities. Consider the following additional requirement.
Condition FC: A sequence of (Ĉ;z)-replica economies satis…es FC if (a) for any i 2 V nV such that q
The two conditions together imply that any small community requiring trade is linked to large community; while the second further implies that sellers from some large community can supply buyers living in a small community. Condition FC (or full clearing) may hold even if the baseline economy violates MC.
For the economy E and the subset of communitiesĈ, consider the large economy E + = nĈ ;Ê; Q; u o obtained by deleting communities that do not belong toĈ,
The next result generalizes Proposition 6 to unbalanced replication. It establishes that the existence of e¢ cient and direct ‡ows of consumption in E + is necessary and su¢ cient for a sequence unbalanced replicas to converge to approximate e¢ ciency. It also establishes that net-trades converge to e¢ ciency in every communities when FC holds, as players in small communities can access a large pool of buyers and sellers to meet their e¢ cient net-trades. Whenever intermediation is not required to clear markets in large communities, equilibria that converge to approximate e¢ ciency exist. In these equilibria, all goods are traded at a unique price in every large community, and there are no distortions to pricing, as a large number of sellers competes to supply any group of buyers belonging toĈ. 15 Prices, however, may di¤er in small communities as market power and resale rents still distort trade in such locations. An anonymous centralized market again approximates trading behavior in the large communities of non-anonymous decentralized markets when intermediation is super ‡uous. Condition FC further implies that trade from the large communities can clear every local market and restore full e¢ ciency. If so, intermediation and distortions vanish even in small markets as competition from the larger communities disciplines prices by reducing rents on every trade. Convergence to e¢ ciency would fail in smaller markets if FC were violated, as price distortions would necessarily curtail trade in some small and poorly connected communities.
Other studies on two-sided networks and matching have exploited variants of condition MC to clear markets and achieve e¢ ciency in decentralized markets without intermediation. Within the out ‡ow competition framework, MC was proven to be necessary and su¢ cient for convergence to e¢ ciency even in environments in which resale was feasible. Our observation di¤ers from most other studies exploiting Hall theorem type arguments as necessity of MC is not built in the trading environment by exogenous assumptions preventing resale. Results would extend to more general replication processes in which all communities grow at possibly heterogeneous rates. Convergence to approximate e¢ ciency in those environments would still require MC holding among the largest communities. Conditions for convergence to full e¢ ciency would, however, di¤er slightly, as communities that are neither large nor small could occasionally mediate trade between larger and smaller communities without creating frictions. The main aim of the section was to provide simple conditions on the economy for trading behavior in large decentralized oligopolistic markets to emulate behavior in large centralized competitive mar-kets. Sequences of replicas were only invoked here, as a parsimonious method to model large decentralized markets in which locations are populated by …nitely many types of traders.
Examples: Large Economies and Replication
Before proceeding to the …nal results, consider three examples of replica economy. In each example, the economy consists of three communities C a , C b , C c . The preferences of all the individuals in community C i satisfy u i (q) = (Q i + q) 1=2 for i 2 fa; b; cg, where Q a = 2, Q b = 1, and Q c = 0. Community C a is populated only by sellers, community C c only by buyers, while players in community C b are neither sellers nor buyers. The …rst two examples di¤er only in the community structure, while the last two di¤er only in the replication process. Begin by considering the economy in which the three communities are linked, and form a grand community (depicted in the left plot of …gure 2). The economy trivially satis…es condition MC, and thus converges to e¢ ciency. As the economy becomes large, consumption in the sellers' community decreases monotonically, while consumption in the buyers' community increases monotonically. In the limit every player consumes one unit. The price paid by intermediaries in community C b converges from below to the competitive equilibrium price, 1=2; while the price paid by buyers in the import community C c monotonically decreases to the same value.
Intermediation by players in community C b vanishes, and such players do not trade in the limit economy. Per-capita social welfare increases monotonically as the economy grows large. The two plots on the left in …gure 3 depict consumption and prices in the unique equilibrium of this sequence of replicas. Next consider the same economy, but suppose that sellers in community C a cannot trade directly with buyers in community C c (depicted in the central plot of …gure 2). If so, players in community C b act as middlemen buying from sellers in community C a to supply buyers in community C c . The economy cannot satisfy condition MC, since no direct trade between sellers and buyers is feasible. Thus, no sequence of out ‡ow equilibria can ever converge to e¢ ciency. In fact, out ‡ow equilibrium consumption in the three communities does not converge. In the limit economy, players in communities C a and C b consume more than players in community C c . The price paid by middlemen in community C b …rst grows and then declines converging to a value below the competitive equilibrium price. The price paid by buyers in community C c instead, monotonically decreases, but always remains above the competitive price. The limit markup made by middlemen is approximately 30%. Per-capita social welfare increases monotonically as the economy grows large, but remains ine¢ cient in the limit economy. The central plots in …gure 3 depict consumption and prices in the unique equilibrium of this sequence of replicas. The out ‡ow model recognizes that the second community structure cannot attain e¢ ciency while mimicking an anonymous Walrasian market, as some players in community C b must necessarily act as intermediaries while transferring a non-negligible amount of consumption from sellers in C a to buyers in C c . The …nal example considers an unbalanced replica of the second community structure, in which players in community C b grow at a faster rate than other players in the economy (depicted in the right plot of …gure 2). In particular, the z th element of the unbalanced replica considered here possesses z players in communities C a and C c , and z 2 in community C b . Any economy in the sequence still violates condition MC, as no direct trade is feasible between the sellers'community and buyers'community. However, the unique symmetric equilibrium of this sequence of unbalanced replicas also converges to e¢ ciency. Approximate e¢ ciency obtains, as only one community is large in the limit and thus MC trivially holds in the large economy. Full e¢ -ciency also obtains, since large communities can clear the aggregate demand and the aggregate supply of any smaller community when the market is su¢ ciently large. The example highlights why results on unbalanced replicas also apply to replication processes in which communities grow at di¤erent rates, and why any intermediation has to take place in the large communities. Consumption and prices for this sequence of replicas are shown in the right plots in …gure 3.
Concluding Remarks on Balanced Replication
The analysis concludes with two additional observations on balanced replication: the …rst presents su¢ cient condition for symmetric equilibrium existence, while the latter relates welfare to market size. For any sequence of symmetric equilibria of a replica, let q i j = lim z!1 zq i:t j:s (z) denote the consumption sold in the limit economy by an individual of type i to all individuals of type j. In a limiting symmetric equilibrium, optimality of ‡ows requires
where i denotes the non-negative multiplier on the out ‡ow constraint, q i Q i . Out ‡ow price distortions vanish in any symmetric equilibrium when a large number of individuals competes to supply each neighbor. The price distortions on in ‡ows, instead, persist for those individuals who resell consumption. However, since the out ‡ow wedges were the complicating factor in the proof of equilibrium existence, stronger results obtain. In all the three cases, limiting revenues in each local market are concave. The result in (b) holds since the costs of supplying out ‡ows are convex in the limit by the restriction on the third derivative. Results in (a) and (c) follow because condition MC directly implies the existence of an e¢ cient out ‡ow equilibrium in the limit economy. The strong conditions on the market structure imposed in (c) further imply that all equilibria converge to e¢ ciency when all sellers and buyers can directly trade.
Finally, Proposition 9 relates per-capita social welfare to market size and shows that welfare increases monotonically as an economy gets replicated. Intuitively, the result obtains because, by de…nition, a balanced replica increases competition uniformly at every location of the trade network. Even economies failing MC become more competitive (though not perfectly competitive) as the number of players grows large.
Proposition 9
If A1 holds and if any balanced replica possesses a unique symmetric equilibrium, then per-capita social welfare increases every time the economy is replicated.
The proof of the proposition exploits the de…nition of balanced replica to establish a link between social welfare and network structure by studying how changes in the number of players at each location a¤ect the Jacobian matrix of the complementarity problem characterizing the symmetric equilibria of a replica. Although the result o¤ers limited testable implications as it holds only for balanced replication, it establishes an interesting property of such a process.
The aim of the section was to present conditions under which competition in decentralized oligopolistic markets could mimic perfect competition. For this to be the case, trade had to be direct in large communities and small communities had to be well connected. Economies, in which intermediation (by buyers or by sellers) was necessary, would never approximate perfect competition and e¢ ciency, as market power distortions would inevitably persist.
In ‡ow Competition
This section shows why our conclusions are not speci…c to the out ‡ow model, by outlining an alternative quantity competition model and comparing it to the out ‡ow model. The webappendix presents a more detailed discussion and examples. For sake of brevity, the analysis assumes that players are constrained in the amount of units that they can purchase. Alternative speci…cations in which the supply side is constrained yield similar results.
In ‡ow Competition:
In the in ‡ow competition model, players simultaneously decide how many units of consumption to buy from each of their neighbors (rather than deciding on how many units to sell to their neighbors). Any player i is constrained not to buy more than Q i units of consumption. Prices are determined at each location so that all units are sold at their marginal cost. Thus, the price paid by Player i for units sold from a neighbor j is determined by the inverse supply curve at node j,
Players sell all of their goods at unique price which coincides with their marginal value of consumption. Buyers expect such prices when choosing their demands. Assumption A1 again implies that @p j (q j )=@q j i > 0 and @p j (q j )=@q i j < 0 for any i 2 V j . The price earned by Player j decreases when his in ‡ows increase, and increases when his out ‡ows increase. Again an argument à la Kreps and Scheinkman could show how price competition among buyers would lead to such prices if individuals had to commit to their in ‡ows. 16 The problem of an individual i 2 V reduces to
If q j i > 0 and q i < Q i , optimality of the ‡ow q j i requires that
The markup on the ‡ow q j i (the di¤erence between the buyer's marginal value and the price paid) is completely determined by two wedges: the monopoly price distortion on all units sold, and the Cournot distortion on the units purchased from seller j. Optimality in the in ‡ow model di¤ers from the out ‡ow model, as di¤erent distortions a¤ect equilibrium pricing. Whereas suppliers were able to commit to their sales in the out ‡ow model, buyers are able to commit to their purchases in the in ‡ow model. The ability to commit to trade ‡ows bene…ts the players executing trades by allowing them to appropriate more gains from trade. Thus, an in ‡ow economy is generally more e¢ cient than an out ‡ow economy, as more units ‡ow to individuals with a higher marginal value. The expression in ‡ow equilibrium is used to refer to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the in ‡ow competition model.
Result Survey: Almost all of the results developed in the context of the out ‡ow model also, apply to the in ‡ow model. Su¢ cient conditions for in ‡ow equilibrium existence di¤er slightly from conditions imposed in the out ‡ow model, and are reported in the web-appendix. In the in ‡ow model sellers supply all their customers at a single price. Buyers, however, often purchase goods from di¤erent suppliers at di¤erent prices, as price distortions can increase their expenditure when they concentrate their demand in a single market. As in the out ‡ow model, resale is a common feature of equilibrium behavior, and linked individuals with di¤erent marginal rates of substitution do not necessarily trade. Su¢ cient conditions for trade to take place between pairs of linked individuals require gains from trade to exceed the out ‡ow price distortion of the buyer. Examples in the web-appendix establish that adding links may still reduce welfare. Results on large markets are not a¤ected by the change in the pricing paradigm. Again, economies in which intermediation cannot vanish never attain e¢ ciency, whereas economies satisfying the condition MC do.
Comments
When can behavior in a decentralized oligopolistic market approximate perfect competition? Providing a simple answer to this question was the main aim of the analysis. To this end, a tractable model of oligopolistic competition in networked markets was introduced. Distinguish-ing features of the model were the option to resell goods and the endogenous identity of buyers and sellers in the economy. Unsurprisingly, behavior in small markets could never approximate perfect competition, as local market power would inevitably distort trade. However, behavior in large decentralized markets was shown to approximate perfect competition whenever resale was not required to clear large markets. In such scenarios, e¢ cient trades obtained in large communities directly without recourse to intermediation; all units were sold at one price in any large community; and intermediation persisted only to supply communities of negligible size. Behavior in these smaller communities was shown to approach perfect competition only when all of their trades could be executed in some large communities. The main implication of the model is that perfectly competitive resale markets do not exist when local market power constrains trade.
Strong assumptions on trade costs were implicit in the two quantity competition models presented. Trade was assumed to be costless between pairs of linked individuals, but extremely costly between any other pair of traders. Such restrictions were only imposed for the sake of clarity. In fact, the model and its conclusions would easily extend to environments in which a weighted network captures the heterogeneous trade costs between pairs of players. Assumptions also required the marginal utility of consumption to be positive for any player in the economy. The setup, however, can approximate environments in which intermediaries do not value consumption, when the marginal utility of such players is su¢ ciently low. Other limitations of the analysis were the omission of an explicit network formation model and the impossibility of migration. Indeed, it would be interesting to know if migration would always lead to e¢ cient community structures. But this question lies beyond the scope of this manuscript.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Begin by establishing existence. For every player i 2 V , the set of feasible out ‡ows
0 is clearly non-empty, compact, convex. Su¢ cient conditions for the best reply maps to be single-valued require: that for every player i revenues from the sales to each neighbor j 2 V i be concave in q i j ; that his costs of supplying units be convex in out ‡ows q i ; and that one of the two conditions be strict. Revenues are concave in each market, if for any ij 2 E
Since q i is a linear function of every out ‡ow q i j and since out ‡ows a¤ect costs only through consumption q i , costs C i (q i ; q i ) are a convex in the vector q i whenever
Assumptions A1 and B1 imply that E1 and E2 hold, with at least one of the two holding strictly. In particular, since by feasibility Q j + q j q j q i j , A1 and the upperbound in B1 imply that revenues are concave since
where I( ) denotes the indicator function (I(A) = 1 if A is true, I(A) = 0 otherwise). Moreover, since Q i + q i q i , A1 and the lowerbound in B1 imply that costs are convex since
Since both indicator maps cannot hold at once either revenues are strictly concave, or costs are strictly convex. Thus, A1 and B1 imply that payo¤s are strictly concave and continuous for each player. Strict concavity of payo¤s and the compactness and convexity of choice set X i require the best-response correspondences to be single-valued. Continuity of the payo¤s implies (by Berge's theorem of the maximum) that best responses are continuous. Thus, the existence of out ‡ow equilibrium is guaranteed by Brouwer's …xed point theorem.
Next observe that su¢ cient conditions for best reply maps to be single-valued do not need to discipline payo¤s when the revenues from selling units are decreasing. In fact, such out ‡ows could never be a best reply for the player selling the units, as marginal costs are positive by assumption A1. Thus, to grant existence it su¢ ces to show A1 and B2 imply that E1 and E2 hold whenever revenues increase. The rest of the argument shows that A1 and B2 imply that the revenue of Player i from sales to every neighbor j 2 V i is concave in q i j and that his costs of supplying units are convex in q i , whenever the revenue from selling units to i increases.
Revenues in market
where the implication holds by summing over all neighbors j. Thus, A1 and the lowerbound in B2 imply that costs are convex when revenues increase, since
Similarly, observe that A1 and the upperbound in B2 imply that revenues are concave when revenues increase, since
As one of the two conditions on revenues and costs holds strictly, assumptionsA1 and B2 imply that the payo¤ of each player is strictly concave and continuous whenever increasing. The strict concavity of payo¤s and the compactness and convexity of the choice set correspondence imply that the best-responses are single-valued. Again Brouwer's …xed point theorem applies and implies existence. Also observe that any combination of the two assumptions B1 and B2 would similarly grant existence.
To prove the characterization …nally observe that the …rst part of the proof implies that solutions can be found by Kuhn-Tucker …rst order conditions. The optimality of a ‡ow q i j then implies that
which simply amounts to the complementarity problem stated in the result.
Proof of Proposition 3. (a) First order necessary conditions immediately establish the result since q
where i denotes the non-negative multiplier on the out ‡ow constraint, q i Q i , and where the latter terms are positive by assumption A1. Moreover, the converse clearly fails due to the positive price distortions inherent to the model. 
(e) If A1 holds, optimality of the trade from k to i requires
which is both necessary and su¢ cient for a trade from k to j to occur.
Proof of Proposition 4. (a)
A pro…le of ‡ows q is e¢ cient if for any ij 2 E the ‡ow q
where i denotes the multiplier of the capacity constraint of Player i. Optimality conditions for an out ‡ow equilibrium, instead, require that for any ij 2 E the ‡ow q i j satis…es
where i denotes the multiplier of the capacity constraint. If q = 0 is e¢ cient, it satis…es condition (2). But then q = 0 is an out ‡ow equilibrium, as it immediately satis…es condition (3). If, however, q 6 = 0 is e¢ cient, then q cannot be an out ‡ow equilibrium, as condition (3) and (2) Proof of Proposition 5. The …rst step of the argument shows that (a) and (b) are equivalent.
If (H; q) 0 for 8H C, it must be that for any T C
where the …rst equality holds since the e¢ cient net trades add to zero (C; q) = 0, and where the second equality holds since CnT
To prove the …nal step it is convenient to map condition MC to the original network structure. 
For any H D, let T (H) = fC 2 C j C \ H 6 = ;g. If MC holds, observe that for any H D
where the …rst inequality holds as T (H) may include more buyers than H. Similarly, for any
If~ (H; q) 0 for any H D, MC holds as for any T C,
where the …rst inequality holds as i 2 S H(T ) if and only if i 2 C \ S for some C 2 V T .
The next step exploits the previous simpli…cation to establish that (c) implies (a) by contradiction. Observe that whenever (ii) holds for any H D
where …rst equality holds by (ii) and the last holds since any pair of players i; j that satis…es j 2 H and i 2 S j , also satis…es i 2 S H and j 2 H \ D i . If MC were violated,~ (H; q) < 0 for some H D. But if so, the previous observation would imply that (i) would also be violated for some player j 2 H since
The …nal step proves that~ (H; q) 0 for any H D implies (c) by induction on D. First establish that the result holds for jDj = 1. Let i denote the only buyer in the economy. By assumption we have that~ (D; q) 0, which in turn implies that~ (D; q) = 0 as supply cannot exceed aggregate demand by construction. Thus ‡ows satisfying both (i) and (ii) can be found by setting q + such that (i) and (ii) hold in the subgraph,
To conclude the proof it su¢ ces to show that, given such ‡ows, the remaining players of the original graph still satisfy MC. Denote byq 2 R V the e¢ cient net-trades q shifted by such ‡ows q. That is for any i 2 V , letq
Consider the subgraph (V 00 ; E 00 ) with vertices V 00 = S 00 [ D 00 with D 00 = DnH and S 00 = SnS H , and with edges restricted to E 00 = E \ fijji 2 S 00 \ j 2 D 00 g. For any K DnH it must be that~ 00 (K;q) =~ 00 (K;q) +~ 00 (H;q) +
since~ 00 (H;q) =~ (H; q) = 0 and P i2S H \S Kq i = 0. Which in turn implies by induction that ‡ows q 00 2 R E 00 + exist that satisfy condition (i) and (ii), since jDnHj < m.
and choose any pro…le of ‡ows _ q from S H to DnH such that
Let • q 2 R V denote the e¢ cient net-trades q adjusted for such ‡ows _ q. After such transfers,
Thus, the • q economy satis…es all the conditions required in the previous step of the proof and MC is su¢ cient.
Proof of Proposition 6. (a) Let (V (z); E(z)) denote the trade network associated to community structure (C z ; E z ). For convenience, occasionally denote u i (q i (z)) by u i (z). Whenever the equilibrium of the replicas converges to e¢ ciency, it must be that lim z!1 (u 0 j (z) u 0 i (z)) = 0 for any two players i; j 2 V (z) for which lim z!1 q i (z) > Q i and lim z!1 q j (z) > Q j . Suppose by contradiction that some player i 2 V (z) resells units in the limit economy,
If so, optimality of ‡ows from i to his neighbors j 2 V i (z) requires that, when q
where i (z) denotes the non-negative multiplier on the out ‡ow constraint, q i (z) Q i . Which contradicts the assumption that the economy becomes competitive. MC fails if and only if r(1) > 0. The de…nition of replica implies r(1) = r(z), because minimizing the maximum resale requires all players of the same type to buy and sell the identical amounts. This is the case, since the average ‡ows across any two player types in a replica (that is P z s=1 P z t=1 q i:s j:t =z 2 ) de…ne ‡ows in the original economy in which resale exceeds r(1)
(by e¢ ciency), which in turn implies that r(1) r(z), as the average resale of a player of type i cannot exceed the maximal resale of a player of type i. Thus, if r(1) > 0, any pro…le of ‡ows leading to the e¢ cient allocation requires at least one player to resell a positive amount of goods in the limit economy. But, by part (a) no such outcome can be supported in an e¢ cient limiting out ‡ow equilibrium as there is no resale in any such equilibrium.
The next part of the proof establishes that MC is su¢ cient for the existence of an e¢ cient symmetric out ‡ow equilibrium in the limit economy. First observe that the solution of the complementarity problem de…ning the symmetric equilibrium ‡ows is lower hemi-continuous in the replica counter z, as each optimality condition de…ning the problem is continuous and di¤erentiable in 1=z, (see problem 4 in the proof of Proposition 9). Therefore, consider ‡ows in the original economy q 2 R satis…es all the out ‡ow equilibrium requirements in the limit economy. In particular, if such ‡ows were chosen by others, no player would be able to pro…tably a¤ect the prices of the goods sold in the limit, as deviations on his behalf could only reduce prices since lim z!1 q i:s j:t (z) = 0. As gains from deviating from q(z) decrease along the sequence of replicas and vanish in the limit, the limit of q(z) is e¢ cient, and belongs to the limit of the symmetric out ‡ow equilibrium correspondence. Lower hemi-continuity of the equilibrium correspondence then guarantees the existence of a selection of equilibrium correspondence that converges to such a limit point. A direct proof of the …nal argument is possible, but more involved. z is large. This is the case since the e¢ cient allocation of consumption is independent of P i2V nV q z i when z is su¢ ciently large given that: assumption A3 implies that lim z!1 q z i < 1 for any i 2 V nV ; the constraint on sales implies lim z!1 q z i Q i ; and the set V (z)nV (z) contains a …nite number of players. Moreover, since the total number of units sold by players in V (z)nV (z) cannot exceed P i2V nV Q i , resale among players inV (z) is always required to achieve the e¢ cient net-trades when condition MC fails in the economy E + . If so, the argument developed in Proposition 6 applies, and establishes that any out ‡ow equilibrium must be ine¢ cient since at least a player inV (z) resells non-negligible amount of consumption in any given pro…le of ‡ows that gives rise to the e¢ cient net-trades.
The next part of the argument establishes why MC is su¢ cient for convergence to approximate e¢ ciency. Observe that the solution of the complementarity problem de…ning the symmetric equilibrium ‡ows is lower hemi-continuous in the replica counter z, as each optimality condition de…ning the problem is continuous and di¤erentiable in z. In particular, optimality of a ‡ow q 
where i denotes the multiplier on the capacity constraint and where
This establishes the lower hemi-continuity in z of the complementarity problem de…ning the symmetric out ‡ow equilibria, as each optimality condition de…ning the problem is continuous and di¤erentiable in z.
Now construct candidate ‡ows that converge to approximate e¢ ciency. For the economy E + , letq 2 RÊ + denote a pro…le of ‡ows satisfying (i) and (ii) in Proposition 5. Such ‡ows exist because MC holds, and satisfy P The proof concludes by establishing that ‡ows q(z) must be arbitrarily close to symmetric equilibrium ‡ows in the limit as z diverges. To verify that ‡ows q i:s j:t (z) =q i j =z for any (i:s); (j:t) 2V (z) are arbitrarily close to equilibrium ‡ows as z diverges, observe that the conjectured ‡ows satisfy lim z!1 q i:s j:t (z) = 0. Therefore, lim z!1 q(z) satis…es all the out ‡ow equilibrium requirements for trades on links ij 2Ê in the limit economy. In particular, if such ‡ows were chosen by others, no player would be able to pro…tably a¤ect the prices of the goods sold in the limit, as deviations on his behalf could only reduce prices since lim z!1 q i:s j:t (z) = 0. Since gains from deviating from q(z) decrease along the sequence of replicas and vanish in the limit, the limit of q(z) is approximately e¢ cient and belongs to the limit of the symmetric out ‡ow equilibrium correspondence. Lower hemi-continuity of the equilibrium correspondence then guarantees the existence of a selection of equilibrium correspondence that converges to such a limit point.
(b) Necessity of FC is immediate from part (a) and the following considerations. If FC were violated, convergence to e¢ ciency in small communities would require trade across and/or within small communities, or trade between buyers in small communities and buyers in large communities. Either scenario would necessarily result in distortions. In the …rst scenario distortions would be a trivial consequence of Proposition 3, while the second distortions would appear as in ‡ow price distortions would never vanish for players purchasing units in the limit economy. The proposed ‡ows q(z) must be arbitrarily close to symmetric equilibrium ‡ows in the limit as z diverges. This is the case because conjectured ‡ows q(z) satisfy lim z!1 q i:s j:t (z) = 0. Again lim z!1 q(z) satis…es all the out ‡ow equilibrium requirements for trades on all links in the limit economy. If such ‡ows were chosen by others, no player would be able to pro…tably a¤ect the prices of the goods sold in the limit, as deviations on his behalf could only reduce prices by lim z!1 q i:s j:t (z) = 0, and because no player resells a non-negligible amount of consumption. As gains from deviating from q(z) again decrease along the sequence of replicas and vanish in the limit, the limit of q(z) is approximately e¢ cient and belongs to the limit of the symmetric equilibrium correspondence. Lower hemi-continuity again guarantees the existence of a selection of equilibrium correspondence that converges to such a limit point.
Proof of Proposition 8. (a) This is a consequence of vanishing price distortions in any e¢ cient limiting economy (which requires concave revenues and convex costs) and of Proposition 6 (which shows that MC implies that a limiting outcomes can be e¢ cient).
(b) Since in any symmetric equilibrium of the limiting economy the out ‡ow wedges vanish, revenues in each market are concave. Since the third derivative is positive, costs of supplying units are convex. Thus existence of a symmetric equilibrium in the limit economy follows as in Proposition 1.
(c) Let i:s 2 arg min j:t2V (z) u 0 j:t (q j:t (z)). If q 6 = 0, for any sequence of out ‡ow equilibrium ‡ows q(z) 2 R E(z) + it must be that i:s 2 S(z), because such a player does not purchase consumption by part (b) of Proposition 3, and because by de…nition of competitive equilibrium 0 q i:s (z) q i . By contradiction suppose that there exists a sequence of out ‡ow equilibria that does not converge to e¢ ciency. If so, the set of players linked to i:s and with marginal utility strictly higher than i:s diverges, since V j (z) S(z) for 8j 2 D(z) implies V j (z) D(z) for 8j 2 S(z), and since lim z!1 jD(z)j = lim z!1 z jDj = 1. This immediately yields a contradiction if lim z!1 (q i:s (z)) > Q i , because Q i < 1 and because by part (c) of Proposition 3 Player i:s would sell a strictly positive amount of consumption in the limit to all his neighbors with strictly higher marginal utility.
If, instead, lim z!1 (q i:s (z)) = Q i , let V + (z) = fk 2 V (z)jq k (z) > Q k g and let i:s 2 arg min j:t2V + (z) u 0 j:t (q j:t (z)). First notice that lim z!1 jV + (z)j = 1, since lim z!1 z P i2V Q i = 1 and since u 00 < 0. Thus, no player in V nV + (z) sells to i:s for z large enough, since a large and diverging number players have strictly higher marginal utility than i:s , if q 6 = 0. Hence, in the limit i:s does not buy. If i:s 2 S(z) for z large, assuming that the sequence of out ‡ow equilibria does not converge e¢ ciency again yields a contradiction. In fact, part (c) of Proposition 3 would imply that Player i:s sells a strictly positive amount of goods in the limit to all his neighbors with strictly higher marginal utility which is impossible since lim z!1 (q i:s (z)) > Q k , since Q i < 1, and because i:s has in…nitely many neighbors with higher marginal utility in the limit economy. A contradiction arises even if i:s 2 D(z) for z large and if the sequence of out ‡ow equilibria does not converge to e¢ ciency. In particular if i:s 2 D(z) for z large enough, it must be that q i > 0 lim z!1 q i:s (z), since i:s only sells for z large enough. Moreover, by de…nition of i:s it must be that, for any j:t 2 V + (z), which in turn by concavity implies that q j > q j:t (z) for any j:t 2 V + (z). Also, notice that q j q j:t (z) = 0 for any j:t 2 V nV + (z). Hence, provided that q 6 = 0, contradiction arises, since 0 = P j:t2V (z) q j:t > P j:t2V (z) q j:t (z).
Thus the limit out ‡ow equilibrium must be e¢ cient.
Proof of Proposition 9. De…ne the total quantity sold from an individual of type i to all individuals of type j in the unique symmetric equilibrium of a (C; z)-replica by q ,
where the second equality obtains, as the the replica counter never appears in an out ‡ow constraint. The matrix Z is positive de…nite because, for an appropriately chosen order of links, it is lower triangular (as goods do not cycle), and because all elements on the main diagonal are positive. Di¤erentiating per-capita social welfare with respect to z one gets that
The last expression is positive since it is a bilinear form and because both Z 0 and J L ( q; jz)
are positive de…nite. In fact, because both are positive de…nite, consider the positive de…nite square root H of J L ( q; jz) 1 (i.e. J L ( q; jz)HH = I). Then Z 0 J L ( q; jz)
Therefore Z 0 J L ( q; jz) 1 and HZ 0 H have the same eigenvalues. Since HZ 0 H = H 0 Z 0 H, such matrix is positive de…nite and thus has only non-negative eigenvalues. The third equality uses the observation that @q i j =@z 6 = 0 implies that the …rst order condition must hold with equality. In fact, if @q 
